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THE DILEMMA OF THE "UNIQUELY JUVENILE"
OFFENDER
More than 25 percent of all juvenile proceedings and 25 to 30 percent
of all juvenile commitments to state institutions arise out of "uniquely
juvenile" offenses.' These offenses encompass such conduct as truancy,
running away from home, mcorrigibility, curfew violation, and being
in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life.2 These and
related offenses, in the case of an adult, would constitute either petty rms-
demeanors or would not be criminal at all. Yet a juvenile charged with
such acts may be subject to the frustrations associated with a court ap-
pearance; in addition, he can be placed on severely restrictive :proba-
tion or committed to a state institution. And, in a minority of states, a
"finquely juvenile" offender must face his initial exposures to the ad-
ministration of justice without any of the safeguards of due process.
The guiding purpose of any system of juvenile justice should be re-
habilitation. This Note is predicated upon the familiar premise that pres-
ent juvenile justice systems, especially as they relate to "uniquely juve-
nile" offenders, are far from effective in serving that purpose and, in
fact, often aggravate the maladies they were designed to cure. After re-
viewing current means of dealing with "uniquely juvenile" rmsconduct,
the Note will examine a suggestion that such offenses be removed en-
tirely from the purview of the courts. Until such a change occurs, how-
ever, immediate action will be needed to protect the right of juveniles
and to effectuate their rehabilitation by providing to "uniquely juvenile"
offenders at least a sense of procedural fairness. In this light, it will be
suggested that juvenile due process rights, recognized to a linuted extent
by the Supreme Court in In re Gault s be extended to "uniquely juve-
nile" offenders. Various of the constitutional rights of fair procedure
will be exarmned to determine whether a need for such extension exists.
1. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMANSTRATIoN OF JusTICE:
TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YoUT- CRIME at 4 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as TAsK FORCE REPORT].
In 1966, "uniquely juvenile" offenses accounted for 63 percent of all Juveiile arrests.
In October 1970, one-half of the 971 inhabitants of the San Diego Juvenile Hall wEre
"urnquely juvenile" offenders. Note, Sectotz 601 California Welfare ,and Intlltidins
Code: A Need for a Change, 9 SAN Dmao L. REv. 2P4, 299 (1972).
2. See, e.g., N.Y. FAmvuy CT. ACT § 712 (McKinney's 1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §
702-1 (Srnth-Hurd Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. AN. ut. 11, § 243 (Purdon's 1939); Tx& REv.
'Crv. StAT. aqt. 23381, § 3 (1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-139 (Repl. Vol.'1972).
3. 387 US. I (1967)..'""1'
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CURRENT AND PROPOSED METHODS OF DEALING WITH
"UNIQUELY JUVENILE" OFFENDERS
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 was the first legislative mam-
festation of the doctrine of parens patrtae.4 The act sought to treat de-
viant children not as crimnals, but as misguided wards of the state. Hear-
ings under the act were to be informal and conlidential, aimed not at
establishing guilt, but at ferreting out the socio-psychological reasons for
aberrant behavior in an effort to provide effective means of rehabilita-
tion.5
By 1925, all but two states had enacted similar legislaton.6 Optimistic
reformers awaiting the results of this beneficent paradigm were badly dis-
appointed. The President's Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency con-
cluded in 1967
[T]he great hopes originally held for the juvenile court have not
been fulfilled. It has not succeeded significantly in rehabilitating
delinquent, youth, in reducing or even stemnumng the tide of juve-
nile criminality, or in bringing justice and compassion to the child
offender. To say that juvenile courts have failed to achieve their
goals is to say no more than what is true of crimunal courts in the
United States. But failure is most striking when hopes are highest.7
4. TASK FoRcE RtpoRT, supra note 1, at 3.
Parens patriae is a doctrine which places the state in the role of parental custodian of
the child. For an interesting history of the evolution of the doctrine, see Rendleman,
Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. RFv. 205 (1971).
5. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note I, at 3.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 7.
Mr. Justice Fortas, writing for the majority in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556,
(1966), appraised the juvenile's plight as "the worst of both worlds: he gets neither
the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
pQstulated for children:' Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U&.S. 528, 560 (1971), noted: "In 1965, over 100,000 juveniles were confined in adult in.
stitutions. Even when not incarcerated with adults the situation may be no better.
One Pennsylvania correctional institution for juveniles is a brick building with barred
windows, locked steel doors, a cyclone fence topped with barbed wire and guard towers.
A former juvenile judge described it as a maximum security prison for adjudged de-
linquents:'
Case law reveals that sentences can be unusually -long. Ex parteWatson, 157 N.C. 340j
72 S.E. 1049 (1911) (six years for vagrancy); In re Wilson 438 Pa. 425, 264 A.2d 614
(1970) (discussion of when longer sentences for juveniles may be justified); State v.
Cagle,- 111 S.C. 548, 96 S.E. 291 (1918) (10 years for petit larceny carrying a 30-day
sentence for an adult).
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Current Systems of Juvenile justice
Most states combine all deviant juvenile behavior into a single "de-
linquent" classification. In these states a truant or curfew violator (or
one who commits any of the "uniquely juvenile" offenses) can be ad-
judged a delinquent and institutionalized.8 A minority of states and the
proposed Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U J.C.A.) separate juvenile mis-
conduct into two classes: 1) "delinquent" misconduct which, if com-
mitted by an adult, would be criminal, and 2) "umquely juvenile ins-
conduct." 9 Those in the latter category are generally designated "Per-
sons in Need of Supervision" (P.I.N.S.) 10
8. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350 (1958), which defines "delinquent" as one:
[1.] who violates any penal law of the United States or of this state, or any
regulation, ordinance or law of any city, town or municipality, or
who commits any offense or act for which an adult could be prose-
cuted in a method partaking of the nature of a criminal action or
proceedings; or,
[2.1 who is beyond control of his parent, parents, guardian, or custodian,
or who is otherwise incorrigible, or who is guilty of unmoral conduct;
or,
[3.1 who is leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life; or,
[4.] who engages in any calling, occupation or exhibition punishable by law
or is found in any place for permitting which an adult [sic] may be
punished by law.
See also ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.010 (Supp. 1971); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201 (1956);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-53 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1101 (1953); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. ii, § 243 (Purdon's 1939); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, -3 (1971);
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-139 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
9. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr S 712 (McKinney's 1963)-
(a) "Juvenile delinquent" means a person over seven and less than sixteen
years of age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would con-
stitute a crime.
(b) "Person m need of supervision" means a male less than sixteen years of
age and a female less than eighteen years of age who is an habitual
truant or who is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient
and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful authority
See also UNnomvt JuvENILE COURT AcT § 2; CAL. WELF. AND INST'NS CODE §§ 601-02
(West 1972)., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301 (Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-2,
3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); MAss. ANN.* LAws ch. 119 § 52 (Supp. 1972Y; N.D. CENT.
CODE ch. 27-20 § 02 (Supp. 1971).
Significantly, various states define juvenile court jurisdiction differently in terms of
maximum age categories:
Sixteen: ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350 (1958); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-53 (1958); N.Y.
FAMILY CT. AcT 712 (McKinney's 1963) (for a male to be a P.I.N.S. or any minor to
be delinquent).
Seventeen: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) (for a male); MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 119, § 52 (1969); TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1 (1971) (for a male).
Eighteen: ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.010 (Supp. 1971); Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-201 (1956);
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Under a bifurcated system, a P.I.N.S. cannot be committed to a state
reformatory for a first offense." However, he may be wrested from his
home and placed in a county camp or special school.'2 Alternatively, he
may be placed on formal probation with the possibility of incurring
severe restrictions on his activity '3 More importantly, a P.I.N.S. on pro-
bation who continues to be unruly may then be adjudicated "delinquent"
and placed in a reformatory ' 4
The effort of the U J.C.A. and the minority of states which differ-
-entiate P.I.N.S. from delinquents is laudable as a first step toward pro-
viding more effective rehabilitation for the "uniquely juvenile" offender.
Realistically, however, when the likelihood of incarceration is con-
sidered, it may be little more than a distinction without a difference.
Furthermore, as will be seen below, separate treatment of "uniquely juve-
nile" offenders may result in denying them the safeguards of due process
which the Supreme Court has extended to juveniles in delinquency ad-
judications.
A Proposed Reform
Unfortunately, juvenile courts often become an expeditious dumping
ground for recalcitrant children. Judge Bazelon, Chief Judge of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, argues that because the
courts are ready and willing to handle "uniquely juvenile" offenders,
other social agencies pass along the burden without attempting to solve
the problem. This situation is truly iromc. The argument for retaining
jurisdiction is that if juvenile courts do not act in such cases, no one else
will; but Judge Bazelon very trenchantly points out that precisely the
opposite is true: because juvenile courts do act, no one else does. Schools
and public agencies refer their problem cases to the courts because they
CAL. WEL.. AND INST'NS. CODE SS 601-02 (West 1972); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301 (Supp.
1972); DEL. CODE ANN. t. 10, 5 1101 (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-2 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1972) (female); N.Y. FAMILy CT. Aar § 712 (McKinney's 1963) (for a female to
be a P..N.S.); PA. STAT. ANNq. tit. 11, § 243 (Purdon's 1939); Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. art.
2338-1, § 3 (1971) (female).
10. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, S 702-1 (Srmth-Hurd Supp. 1972); N.Y. FAMILy CT. Acr
§ 712 (McKinney's 1963).
11. CAL. WELF. AND INSr'Ns CODE § 730 (West 1972); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2320 (Supp.
1972); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-30-32 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 754 (McKin-
ney's 1963).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. CAL. WrEL. AND INSTiNs CODE 5 602 (West 1972); ILL.. A,. STAT. ch. 37, 5 705-7
(Smuth-Hurd Supp. 1972).
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have jurisdiction, because they exercise it, and because they hold out
promises that they can provide solutions.15
The President's Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency has recom-
mended that a study be initiated to explore the possibility of removing
"uniquely juvenile" misconduct from the purview of the juvenile courts
and placing the responsibility with social rehabilitation agencies. 16 Only
upon a showing that thorough efforts at rehabilitation had failed and
that immient danger to the child and others persisted could judicial ac-
tion be initiated.' 7
Such a method of dealing with "uniquely juvenile" misconduct would
appear to be beneficial to all concerned. By removing the vast number
of such offenses from their case load, juvenile courts would be able to
give more attention to serious offenders. At the same time, the non-
criminal juvenile offender would be spared the frustrations of a court
experience and would have an opportunity to gain more effective coun-
seling and rehabilitation apart from the coercion of a court order. Society
clearly would benefit from more effective rehabilitation of "uniquely
juvenile" offenders and from the increased attention courts could give
to more serious juvenile offenders.
, While such a program would require the full participation of parents,
police, school authorities, and community groups, such involvement
could be more meaningful to the juvenile than court-imposed restrictions.
Attendance at rehabilitation sessions would be voluntary, and enlight-
ened counseling could replace institutional coercion. Truants would be
interviewed to assess why they dislike school, and alternative solutions
could be considered. They would be informed 'why they should attend,
rather than simply being told that they must attend. If necessary, chil-
dren could be transferred to different school districts to get a "fresh
start." Runaways and their parents would be counseled jointly to de-
termine why home conditions had become intolerable for the youth.
Community rehabilitation agencies could create a sense of empathy with
society's goals instead of antipathy Police would be without authority
to apprehend youths unless damage to person or property was imminent.
Iowever, the police could refer problems to the agency for investiga-
tion.
It is hoped that state legislatures will give serious consideration to
,establishing a non-judicial means of dealing with "uniquely juvenile"
15. Bazelon, Beyond Control of the Juvenile Court, 21 JUV. CT. JUDGES J. 44 (1970).
16. TASK Foitcz .,supr -at 26-277 qd:' pe ,
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offenders. However, implementation of such a system will require time,
and until more effective means are evolved, the "uniquely juvenile" of-
fender will remain subject to the control of the courts. While a minority
of states and the U J.C.A. have recognized the problem by -separating
"umquely juvenile" misconduct from delinquent misconduct, the results
of the dual system-in terms of effective rehabilitation-may be little bet-
ter, and in some regards worse, than those of the single classification
systems whch are used in a majority of states. Recognizing that serious
reform is only in the distant future, the means of improving current
methods of dealing with "uniquely juvenile" offenders must be con-
sidered.
THE "UNIQUELY JUVENILE" OFFENDER AND DUE PRocEss
The Task Force Report cautioned the juvenile courts and suggested
'that they may be aggravating the very harm they were designed to cort
rect: "The most informed and benign institutional treatment of the
child may contain withiii it the seeds of its own frustration and, it-
self may often feed the very -disorder it is designed to cure." I Usually
a juvenile offender receives his initial exposure-to ,the contifs during a
delinquency adjudication., Unless every eff6rt is, made to instill in hs
mind a sense of procedural fairness, he may walk away viewing the sys-
tem of justice as retributive rather than rehabilitative. This outlook may
fester into hostility, and a system designed to create reformed and re-
sponsible citizens may instead produce sociopaths.
The Need To Extend Due Process to P.I.N.S. Proceedings
In 1967 the Supreme Court recognized the need for .procedural fair-
ness in juvenile proceedings. In In re Gault,"9 the Court held that when-
ever a juvenile is accused of committing acts which may result in a de-
linquency adjudication and possible incarceration in a state institution,
he must be afforded four of the fundamental rights of due process. These
rights and .others which arguably should attach in juvenile proceedings
will be discussed below.
The immediate question, however, is whether the result of Gault
should be extended to P.I.N.S. proceedings ii jiisdictions which have
differentiated "uniquely juvenile" misconduct from "delinquent" ins-
conduct. The need to provide a sense of procedural fairness in a juve
18. TAs FoRCm REPoRT, supra note 1, at 8. "'
19. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). " "
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nile's initial exposure to the courts already has been suggested; tins need
may be even more profound in the case of "uniquely juvenile" offenders
who are forced to adjust to the frustrations of bureaucratic methods for
what may be perceived as petty offenses. Furthermore, the consequences
of a P.I.N.S. proceeding may involve as substantial a restraint on liberty,
create as pernicious a stigma, and result in as severe a disruption in the
life of the juvenile as a "delinquency" adjudication. A 13-year-old can
be placed in a state home or special school for as long as eight years as
a result of a P.I.N.S. adjudication, or he can be placed on severely re-
strictive probation. And, as was noted earlier, a further violation while
on such probation can result in commitment to a state reformatory for
delinquents. Despite the fact that penalities associated with P.I.N.S. pro-
ceedings are legally less severe than those resulting from delinquency
adjudications, it can be expected that the stigma attached by his peers
to a juvenile on severe probation after a P.I.N.S. determination will be
no less than that attached to a "delinquent." The result may well dis-
rupt the future of a juvenile as much as a delinquency adjudication
would. Nevertheless, it appears that under current Supreme Court rul-
ings, the "uniquely juvenile" offender in a state winch distinguishes such
offenders from delinquents is without any of the procedural safeguards
of due process.
In Gault, a juvenile was charged with making an obscene phone call
to a woman, an offense for which an adult could have been prosecuted
in criminal proceedings. While holding that in such cases the juvenile
must be afforded certain rights of due process, the Supreme Court limited
its holding to "proceedings by winch a determination is made as to
whether a juvenile is a 'delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on
his part, with the consequence that he may be commtted to a state in-
stitution." 20 Two subsequent Supreme Court decisions have raised seri-
ous questions concerning this limitation and the likelihood that the Court
would be willing to extend Gault to P.I.N.S. proceedings.
In In re Winshp,21 the Court extended to juvenile proceedings the re-
quirement that allegations be proved "beyond reasonable doubt." How-
ever, the rule is applicable only in "the adjudicatory stage when a juve-
nile is charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed
by an adult." 22 It would thus appear that the Court has limited judicial
supervision of juvenile proceedings even more narrowly than it did in
20. Id. at 13.
21. 397 US. 358 (1970).
22. Id. at 359.
[Vol. 14:386
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Gault. Under Winshzp, a "uniquely juvenile" offender in one of the
jurisdictions with a single classification system of juvenile misconduct
could be found delinquent and institutionalized without the benefit of
the criminal standard of proof.
The Court's decision in Wyman v. James23 has been cited as support
for the proposition that "in juvenile court matters the current Court will
refuse to draw the implications of Gault beyond those proceedings in
which a juvenile is charged with an offense that would be a crime if com-
nutted by an adult." 2 4 In Wyman, a welfare recipient objected to home
visitations by a caseworker as a condition to receiving assistance on the
ground that such a visitation is a search and, in the absence of her con-
sent or a warrant based on probable cause, is violative of her rights under
the fourth and fourteenth amendments. The Court rejected this claim,
holding that a home visitation is not a search in the traditional criminal
law context of the fourth amendment, that the state's reasons for requir-
ing it are in fact beneficent, and that the consequence of refusal to permit
such visitation is not a criminal prosecution but the termination of re-
lief benefits. If the reasoning of the Court in Wyman is applied by anal-
ogy to juvenile court matters, it would appear that the Court will draw
the line at what are in fact "criminal" offenses. Thus, in states with a
separate classification of "uniquely juvenile" offenses, which are not in
fact "crimmal," any rights of due process would be inapplicable in
P.I.N.S. proceedings. Furthermore, in states with a single classification
of juvenile misconduct, the "uniquely juvenile" offender, who can be
found delinquent and institutionalized, would have at most the rights
provided in Gault. Indeed, the path could appear open to the Court to
redefine its limitation in Gault as being equivalent to that applied in
Winship, thus divesting the "uniquely juvenile' offender in single classi-
fication states of the rights he appears to have under Gault.
Judicial adoption of any rationale that would limit due process pro-
tections strictly to juvenile proceedings involving "criminal" conduct
would be unfortunate. In the event of such a development, a state with
a single classification system could define a charge against a juvenile
within the broad language of a "uniquely juvenile" offense, thus facili-
tating "criminal" prosecution without provision for the juvenile's due
process rights. Moreover, in states with bifurcated systems, similar
anomalies can and already do arise from the use of "juvenile plea bar-
23. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
24. Burt, Forcmg Protecton on Children and their Parents: The Impact of Wyman
,v. Jamnes, 69 U. Micn. L. REv. 1259, 1265 (1971).
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gaining." A Califorma study, for example, reveals that many delinquency
complaints are reduced to P.I.N.S. complaints by juvenile court officers
if the juvenile is willing to accept strict formal probation as an alterna-
tive to adjudication.-
In terms of the severe consequences which may result from proceed-
ings involving "uniquely juvenile" misconduct (either in states with
single or dual classification systems), it is difficult not to characterize such
proceedings as criminal to a substantial degree. When the necessity of
instilling a sense of fairness rather than frustration is taken into account,
the argument for extension of due process rights may become impera-
tive.
Due Process Rzghts Applicable to Juveniles
Among those rights that traditionally have been considered funda-
mental to due process, some have been discussed by the Supreme Couit
m relation to juvenile proceedings and others have not. It will be ob-
served that the application of such individual rights poses special prob-
lems in the context of "uniquely juvenile" offenders. Gault established
that whenever a juvenile is accused of committing acts which may-.result
in a delinquency adjudication and institutionalization: .(1) Timely alotie
of scheduled proceedings and a description of fhe charges must be pre-
sented to the juvenile and -his parents; (2) the juvenile and his p'arents
must be notified of a right to counsel; and, if they are indigent; that -coun-
sel will be appointed; (3) the juvenile must be warned of his fifth and
fourteenth amendment privilege against self-incrimination; and (4) the
juvenile must be afforded the right to confront and .cross-examine -wit-
nesses. In addition, Winship requires the use of the criminal standard of
proof, "beyond reasonable doubt," whenever a juvenile.is accused .of
committing acts which would be criminal in the case of an adult. By
contrast, the Court in McKeiver v. Pennsy]vana26 refused to extend to
juveniles the right to a trial by jury-
After considering. these xights and their application to "umquely'juve-
nile" o~fenders, four other- due process; issues-waiver of privileges and
rights, double jeopardy, appellate review, and right to a transcript-will
be examined.
In discussing the extension of due. process rights to "uniquely juve-
nile" offenders;.ahid specificdlly to P.I.N.S., it may be helpful to employ
25. Note, Section 601 California Welfare and Institutions Code: A Need for aCbange,
,9 Sw4.Dro L..Ri v 294, 309 (1972)..
26. 403 US. 528 (1971)...
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a balancing test, weighing.factors which the Supreme Court has aricu-
lated in Gault, WinsIip, and McKeiver The three most salient factors
are: (1) effect of adjudication on the child, (2) the burden imposed on
the admimstration of justice by engrafting the right onto the system,
and (3) the increased protection to the child and the accuracy of fact-
inding which the inclusion of the due process right would ensure.
1. Notice of the Charges and Constitutional Vagueness
Gault established as a parameter of due process that a minor alleged
to have committed a delinquent act must receive timely notice of the
charges against him.2 7 "Timely" is interpreted as that which would allow
sufficient time to prepare a proper defense.28 It is intuitively obvious that
before any hearing for a delinquent or-P.I.N.S. can commence, the party
accused must know why he has been called before his inquisitors. With-
out this, the right to a defense is an empty promise.
Timely notice of the charges will not be meaningful if the offenses
are described in terms so vague as to be obscure and arbitrary, a common
occurrence with many of the "uniquely juvenile" offenses.29 In Con-
nally v. General Construction Co.,80 the Supreme Court established that
a statute is unconstitutionally vague when it "either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." a1
The Court more recently struck down a vagrancy ordinance which pro-
scribed the assembly of three or more people on a public sidewalk con-
ducting themselves in a manner annoying to others. Thus, it was rea-
soned in Coates V. Cincinnat8 2 that conduct which annoys some people
27. 387 U.S. at 33.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., ALA. CODF tit. 13, § 350 (1958) (leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or im-
moral life); ALAsKA STAT. § 47.1o.oio (Supp. 1971) (conducts himself so as to endanger
the morals or health of himself or others); CAL WEL_. AND) INST'Ns CODE § 601 (West
1972) (from any cause is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life);
D.C. CoDE ANw. § 16-2301 (8) (a) (Supp. 1972) (is in need of care or rehabilitation);
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 119, § 52 (1969) (habitually associates with vicious or immoral
persons).
30. 269 US. 385 (1926).
31. Id. at 391. See also Giacclo v. Pennsylvama, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Jordan v. De
George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951); A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233
(1925); See generally Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
32. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
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would not annoy others; the statute was therefore violative of due
process inasmuch as no precise standard of conduct had been specified.
It is submitted that the same result should obtain in the case of a statute
proscribing conduct from which it may be inferred, for example, that
a juvenile is in danger of leading an "immoral" life. In today's society,
"immoral" defies definition. Such a vague standard affords little guid-
ance to the child, his parents, or counsel regarding the exact nature of
the proscribed conduct or of a means of defense and is at best arbitrary
even in the hands of the most conscientious judge. 33 Nevertheless, in
1969, the Supreme Court rejected an opportunity to extend protection
against vague statutes to juveniles. Certiorari was denied in Mattzello v.
Connecticut,34 and as a result Frances Mattiello, a girl of 17, was com-
mitted to the Connecticut State Farm for Women until she reached 21
because she was in "manifest danger of falling into habits of vice. ." 81
Frances' misconduct was walking with a lascivious carriage.
State courts consistently have upheld vague juvenile statutes, often on
the ground that they are not punishing juveniles, but are merely pre-
scribing regenerative treatment in order to quash criminal tendencies be-
fore they develop. 6 Such reasoning loses force when the severe conse-
quences which can follow from a "uniquely juvenile" offense are con-
sidered. A possible break in this trend may be found in People v. Allen, 7
where the New York Court of Appeals reversed an adjudication that
three juveniles were wayward for being "morally depraved or in danger
of becoming morally depraved." .8 While the Allen court did not ex-
pressly overrule an earlier decision in People v. Salisburg,89 which had
upheld the same statute against a challenge of vagueness, it intimated that
definutions of proscribed juvenile conduct must comply with substantive
33. See Comment, Statutory Vagueness in Juvenile Law: The Supreme Court and
Mattiello v. Connecticut, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 143, 147-48 (1969).
34. 395 U.S. 209 (1969).
35. CoNN.. GEN. STAT. Am. § 17-379 (1960).
36. See, e.g., In re R., 274 Cal. App. 2d 749, 79 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1969); People v. Diebert,
117 Cal. App. 2d 410, 256 P.2d 355 (1953); State v. Mattello, 154 Conn. 737, 225 A.2d 201
(1966); State v. L.N, 109 N.J. Super. 278, 263 A.2d 150 (1970); People v. Salisbury, 18
N.Y.2d 899, 223 N.E.2d 43, 276 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1966); Commonwealth v. Brasher, 270
N.E.2d 389 (Mass. 1971).
37. 22 N.Y.2d 465, 239 N.E.2d 879, 293 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1968)
38. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. §§ 913-a (5) (6) (1953). See also Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F.
Supp. 371 (1971), where a three-judge panel found this statute to provide "wholly in-
adequate safeguards against arbitrary application, and insufficient guarantees that minors
sentenced as 'wayward' will be treated non-punitively." id. at 377
39. 18 N.Y.2d 899, 223 N.E.2d 43, 276 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1966).
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due process and that adjudications based on vague standards would be
difficult to sustain in the future. However, in State v. L.N.,40 the New
Jersey Supreme Court limited Gault to the four procedural due process
rights specifically enumerated, reasoning that Gault did not hold that
juvenile statutes are to be tested by general constitutional rules applicable
in criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the court upheld the delinquency
adjudication of a 15-year-old cleaning fluid sniffer on the ground that he
was deporting himself in a manner so as to endanger his morals, health
and general welfare.4'
Unless protection against vague statutes is incorporated into the re-
quirement of Gault that a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding be given
timely notice of the charges, the beneficial safeguard of such a require-
ment will remain a useless shield. Extension of such protection to P.I.N.S.
proceedings is especially essential because of the extreme vagueness with
which many of the "umquely juvenile" offenses are defined.
2. Rzgbt to Counsel
The Supreme Court in Gault held that in a delinquency adjudication
which can result in institutionalization, the juvenile has a constitutional
right to counsel, and if the parents of the child are indigent, to be notified
that counsel will be appointed by the court. 42 Two questions arise con-
cerning the right of counsel: first, whether such right should extend to
P.I.N.S. proceedings and second, whether the right to counsel should
extend to intake or preliminary juvenile proceedings.
The U J.C.A. and several of the state statutes with dual classifications
of juvenile misconduct provide for the right to counsel at any stage of
any proceeding.43 Such broad language, according to the comments to
section 26 of the U J.C.A., is meant to include P.I.N.S. adjudications.
However, in the absence of such a statutory right, there appears at pres-
ent to be no right to counsel in P.I.N.S. proceedings."
40. 109 N.J. Super. 278, 263 A.2d 150 (1970).
41. NJ. REv. STAT. § 2A. 4-14 (2) (in) (1937).
42. 387 U.S. at 41.
In states with a single classification of juvenile misconduct, it will be necessary, under
the Gault ruling as it now stands, to provide counsel m all adjudications, since even a
"uniquely juvenile" offender may be found delinquent.
43. UFORM JuvENaE CouRT Acr § 26; CAL. WLl'. ANm INsT'qs CODE § 625 (West
1972); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (Supp. 1971).
44. In State v. Acuna, 78 N.M. 119, 428 P.2d 658 (1967), a New Mexico court held
that the constitutional right to counsel does not extend to a hearing to determin the
juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction to criminal court. It reasoned that the Supreme
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The Supreme Court in Argersinger v. Hamli4 5 recently extended the
right to counsel to any criminal defendant who faces the possibility of
even a single day's imprisonment. The Court reasoned that liberty is too
precious to be terminated, even briefly, without the benefit of counsel.
A P.I.N.S. adjudication can have a far more serious impact on a child
than a single day in jail would have upon a mature adult. While impos-
ing the requirement of right to counsel would, to an extent, encumber
the juvenile court system, the attorney's presence would ensure that only
those who really need the supervision of the court are adjudged P.I.N.S.
The balance appears to rest on the side of extending the right to counsel
to P.I.N.S. proceedings.
In Gault, the right to counsel in delinquency proceedings was spe-
cifically limited to adjudicatory proceedings.46 Forty-two jurisdictions
specifically provide for intake proceedings," and in 1967, more than 50
percent of all cases referred to juvenile courts were terminated at this
stage.4 8 The purpose of intake proceedings is to eliminate complaints
over which the court has no jurisdiction, where there is inadequate evi-
dence to justify further proceedings, or where the best interest of the
public and child would not be served through adjudication.4 The "best
interest" ground is the broadest, and most cases are eliminated from fur-
ther consideration on this basis.50
Many abuses and inequities can be perpetrated by intake personnel
through the use of such an arbitrary standard as "best interest." The
President's Task Force has recommended that: "Written guides and
standards should be formulated and imported in the course of inservice
training Explicit written criteria would also facilitate achieving
greater consistency in decisionmaking." 51 Because the standard is at the
least arbitrary even in the hands of conscientious intake personnel and
Court m Gault had specifically limited its holding to an adjudicatory determination of
delinquency
45. 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972).
46. "The problems of pre-adjudication treatment of juveniles, and of post-adjudica-
tion disposition, are umque to the juvenile process; hence what we hold in this opinion
with regard to the procedural requirements at the adjudicatory stage has no necessary
applicability to other steps of the juvenile process." 387 U.S. 1, 31 (1967).
47. Ferster, Courtless, & Snethen, Separating Official and Unofficial Delinquents:
Juvenile Court Intake, 55 IowA L. REv. 864, 866 (1970).
48. Ferster & Courtless, Intake Process in the. Affluent County juvenile Court, 22
HASTNGs LJ. 1127 n.1 (1971).
49. Id. at 1128.
50, Id. at 1131.
51. TAsK FoRcE REPoRT, supra note 1, 2t 21.
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may be capricious in less capable hands, it is highly important that a juve-
nile be afforded the right to counsel at intake. Indeed, several state
statutes provide for the right to counsel at this stage.52
An argument for implementing a constitutional right to counsel at
intake proceedings may be derived from Coleman v. Alabama,53 where
the Supreme Court held that if it can be shown that a preliminary hear-
ing is such a critical stage in a state's adjudicatory mechamsm that sub-
stantial rights of a criminal defendant can be lost in such proceeding,
then the right to counsel at the preliminary hearing is a constitutional
imperative. Intake proceedings are, at least in form, the juvenile system's
equivalent to preliminary hearings. Both the possible results of a juve-
nile proceeding and the immediate effects of the intake proceeding dem-
onstrate the need for counsel at this stage. As noted earlier, juvenile pro-
ceedings may result in restraints on liberty as significant as those result-
mg from an adult criminal trial. Moreover, intake proceedings may be
the critical determinant of the end result. This is true because statements
made to, intake officers are probably admissible at adjudication in most
states, since only a few statutes specifically prohibit their use.5 Further-
more, intake officers can, at their discretion, impose harsh formal pro-
bation as an alternative to adjudication.65 In order that the juvenile may
be able to balance the complex advantage, and disadvantages of proba-
tion or adjudication, and in order to protect what may be critical rights,
the right to counsel may be constitutionally required for juveniles at in-
take proceedings.56
52. See, e.g., Coo. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-1(2) (d) (ii) (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. C6DE
ch. 27-20-26 (Supp. 1971).
53. 399 U.S. 1 (1970). See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932), where the
Court remarked that a defendant "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step ,in
the proceeding against him."
54. See, e.g., IL. REv. STAT. ch, 37 § 702-9 (1) (Supp. 1972); MD. ANt. CoDE art, 26,
§ 70- (Su "p. 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-10 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. FAMLY CT. AcT
§ 735 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
55. Ferster & Courtless, supra note 48, at 1130.
56. See Paulsen,.Kent v. United States: The Consttutionaal Context of Juvuenile Cases,
1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167, 189, (1966); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts,
and Indimdualized justice, 79 HARv. L. REv. 775, 789 (1966).
It may be possible to utilize an equal-protection argument for a. right to counsel at
juvenile intake proceedings. A federal court of appeals .held in In re Brown, 439 F.2d 47
(3d Cir. 1971), that where a state had granted adults an absolute right of appeal, it was
a violation of equal protection to deny the same right to juveniles where the result of
the proceeding could restrain the juvenile's liberty Thus,- if it can be shown that intake
,proceedings are.the,substantial equivalent -of an .adult preliminary hearing at which sub-
stantial rights can be lost th en,followmg Colema7A it can be argued that a state demes
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3 Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
As noted earlier, Gault extended to juveniles in delinquency adjudica-
tions the privilege against self-incrimination. 57 In the majority of states
where a minor can be adjudicated delinquent for "uniquely juvenile"
misconduct, the privilege clearly attaches in all cases.58 However, there
would appear to be no such constitutional privilege in P.I.N.S. proceed-
ings in states with dual classification systems.
Several of the dual classification states have extended the privilege by
statute.59 California, for example, requires that the minor be warned of
his right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimnation at the time
of apprehension.60 The Califorma Court of Appeals in In re RambeauO'
went further in holding that a confession obtained from a juvenile after
his apprehension for pursuing conduct which placed him "in danger of
leading a dissolute life," 02 was madmssible even though the minor had
been warned of his privilege against self-incrimmation.s Taking into
consideration the terror which a juvenile may feel upon apprehension,
the result appears justified as a safeguard against mistaken or coerced con-
fessions. The burden to the admimstration of justice caused by extend-
ing to P.I.N.S. proceedings the privilege against self-incrimination is
a juvenile equal protection of the laws by denying to him the right to counsel at
intake.
57. 387 U.S. at 55.
58. See, e.g., Leach v. State, 428 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. 1968), where a twelve-year-
old girl was adjudged delinquent under a Texas statute ("habitually deports herself as to
injure or endanger the morals or health of herself or others") for twice running away
from home. Without prior warning of her rights against self-incrimination, she was in-
terrogated by a probation officer. She admitted running away, and the testimony of the
probation officer was admitted into evidence at her adjudication. The Texas Court of
Appeals held that inculpatory statements made prior to a valid waiver of the privilege
against self-incrimmation are inadmissible.
59. CAL. WEry. AND INsT'Ns CoDE 5 630 (West 1972); N.Y. FAMiLY CT. Acr 5 741
(McKinney's 1963).
The UJ.CA. explicitly states that the privilege extends to those alleged to have com-
mitted delinquent acts. UNiORM JuvEN E CoURT Acr § 27 However, there is nothing
in the act which implies that the privilege extends to P.I.N.S. adjudications.
60. CAL. WELr. AND INSr'NS CoDE 1 625 (West 1972).
61. 266 Cal. App. 2d 1, 72 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1968).
62. CAL. WELF. AMD INST'NS CODE 5 601 (West 1972).
63. Cf. In re R., 274 Cal. App. 2d 749, 79 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1969), where a juvenile was
declared a ward of the court upon his admission of conduct which the court found
involved a dangerous possibility that he would lead a dissolute, idle, mimoral life under
CAL. WtaI. AND INsT'Ns CoDE § 601 (West 1972). The appellate court reversed, stating
that the minor's confession without corroboration was insufficient evidence, even though
the confession was made voluntarily after a proper warning had been administered.
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slight in comparison to the increased assurance of fundamental fairness
and accurate fact-finding which would result.
4 Right to Confront and Cross-Exarmne Witnesses
The right of juveniles to confront and cross-examine witnesses is guar-
anteed by Gault in delinquency adjudications." This right is essential to
a just determination in any hearing-civil, criminal, delinquency, or
P.I.N.S. Its denial to a minor in a P.I.N.S. adjudication could precipitate
frustration not only with the juvenile system, but with all systems of
justice-a frustration which might fester into a determined conviction of
contempt. A juvenile court designed to pursue justice and rehabilitation
can ill afford to undermine its goal with such an internal Inequity.
5. Standard of Proof
Before Gault, juvenile adjudications generally were considered civil
proceedings; the required burden of proof was merely a preponderance
of the evidence.0 5 After Gault, however, the validity of the civil stand-
ard was brought into question, and while most courts retained the civil
standard,"' several adopted the crimmal standard.67 The Supreme Court
settled the question in In re Winship' s by holding that when a juvenile
is accused of committing acts which would constitute a crime in the case
of an adult, the standard of proof must be "beyond reasonable doubt."
It would appear that under both single and dual classification systems, the
civil standard remains acceptable in cases of "uniquely juvenile" offenses.
While most of the states with dual classification systems retain the civil
standard in P.I.N.S. proceedings either by statuteP9 or case law,70 several
64. 387 US. at 57
65. See, e.g., In re Smith, 21 App. Div. 2d 737, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1964); In re Moon,
20 App. Div. 2d 622, 244 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1963).
Since 1946, Virgima juvenile courts have required allegations to be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt m cases where a juvenile is charged with conduct which m the case
of an adult would be crminnal. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444
(1946).
66. See, e.g., In re M, 70 Cal.2d 460, 450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969); In re Ellis,
253 A.2d 789 (D.C. App. 1969); State v. Arenas, 253 Ore. 215, 453 P.2d 915 (1969); State
v. Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Crim. 1969).
'67. See, e.g., In re Urbasek, 38 IlL. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967).
68. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
69. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANx. § 16-2317(b) (Supp. 1972); IL-. ANN. STAT. ch. 37,
S 701-4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 744 (McKinmey's 1963).
70. See, e.g., In re KD.K, 269 Cal. App. 2d 646, 75 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1969).
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of these states71 as well as the U J.C.A.72 require the use of the crimi-
nal standard before a juvenile can be adjudicated a P.I.N.S.
The standard of proof question, as presently resolved, presents an un-
fortunate example of the way in which the rights of the juvenile can be
abused under single classification systems if such rights are extended only
to cases where the juvenile's conduct is "criminal." 73 Where a juvenile,
in a single classification jurisdiction, has committed an act which would
be criminal if committed by an adult, the prosecutor may find it
expeditous to define such conduct instead within the broad language
of a "uniquely juvenile" offense. As a result, the juvenile could be ad-
judged delinquent and institutionalized upon only a preponderance of
the evidence. Such an anomaly in the case of the single classifica-
tion system, coupled with the severity of the consequences awaiting a
"iuniquely juvenile" offender under either system, suggests the need for
an application of the criminal standard in all cases.
6. Jury Trial
McKewver v. Pennsylvama74 represents a significant step in the de-
velopment of juvenile due process rights. While several courts had con-
strued Gault to require trial by jury in juvenile delinquency adjudica-
tions,7 5 most courts had not found it to be essential for fundamentally
fair treatment of juveniles. 76 Most statutes17 and the U J.C.A.78 specifi-
cally deny the juvenile a right to trial by jury One reason cited for re-
71. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 119, § 58 (Supp. 1972); N.D. CENcr. CoDE § 27-20-29
(2) (Supp. 1971).
72. UNWORM JUVENILE COURT Acr § 29(b).
73. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
74. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
75. See, e.g., Nieves v. United States, 280 F Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); DeBacker v.
Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 (1968); Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d
716 (1968).
.76. See, e.g., In re Fucim, 44 Ill. 2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380 (1970); Bible v. State, 253
Ind. 373, 254 NZE.2d 319 (1970); Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1968);
In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 255 A.2d 419 (1969); Hopkins v. Youth Court, 227 So. 2.d 282
(Miss. 1969); In re J.W., 106 NJ. Super. 129, 254 A.2d 334 (1969); In re D., 27 N.Y.2d
90, 261 N..2d 627, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1970);,In re Agler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 249 N.E.2d
808 (1969); State v. Turner, 253 Ore. 235, 453 P.2d 910 (1969); see also In re Geiger, 184
Neb. 581, 169 N.W.2d 431 (1969); Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d 272, 438 P.2d 20 (1968).
77. ALA. CODE tie. 13, § 369 (1958); ALAs A STAT. § 47.10.070 (Supp. 1971); Amiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 8-229 (1956); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1175 (Supp. 1970); N.D. CENT.
CoDE § 27-20-24 (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. AN.tt.i 11, § 247 (1965); D.C. CoDE§ 16-2316
(a) (Supp. 1972).
78. UmmiOm JuvENIE Covn-i Act§ 24' (a)..
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fusal to provide jury trials in juvenile cases is that the presence of a jury
might destroy the definite advantages of the juvenile system-confiden-
tiality, flexibility and informality 79
In 1971, the Supreme Court settled all controversy on the question by
holding in MoKeiver that juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to a
trial by jury The Court reasoned that the delay and the likelihood of
publicity inherent in jury trials outweigh any advantage a jury trial might
offer the juvenile. Justice Douglas, in dissent, advocated the right to
trial by jury for a juvenile whose misconduct would constitute a felony
if perpetrated by an adult.80
The significance of McKezver lies in the fact that while Gault and
Winsbhp found juvenile adjudications in many ways siilar to adult
criminal prosecutions, McKezver recognizes that they are in fact dif-
ferent. Some commentators suggest that McKeiver indicates that the
Court has said "enough" and that juvenile courts now can proceed on an
unobstructed parens patriae course unencumbered by any more due
process restraints."' However, a careful reading of McKezver reveals that
the four main arguments relied upon by the Court denigrate only the
right to jury trial: (1) A jury would remake juvenile court into a full
adversary hearing and terminate any of its idealistic, informal, and pa-
ternalistic attributes; 2 (2) a jury would not strengthen the fact-finding
process;8 (3) it is the privilege of the state to decide if jury trial is neces-
sary," and (4) a jury trial would encompass traditional delay and
clamor.8 5
These four arguments militate only against extension of a right to trial
.by jury The other parameters of fundamental fairness do not endanger
the efficiency of the court or its confidentiality to the same extent; in-
deed, most of the guarantees increase its accuracy as a fact-finding tri-
bunal. Thus, it canbe inferred that McKezver was decided primarily on
the ground that imposition of the jury trial would hamper the adnmis-
tration and confidentiality of the juvenile courts. If this is an accurate
reading, the court is not abrogating due process, or the spirit of Gault,
79. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967); TAsK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 38.
80. 403 U.S. at 559. Duncan v. Loisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), established the right of
an adult to trial by jury in state prosecutions for serious criminal offenses.
81. Comment, Double Jeopardy and the juvenile, 11 J. OF Fa_. L. 603, 611 (1972).
82. 403 US. at 545.
83. id. at 547
84. Id.
-;;..85. Id. at 550.
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but is merely sparing juvenile courts from the imposition of a feature
which would significantly encumber their operation without adding any
marked improvement to the final product. A trial by judge is not an un-
fair trial. Prolonging of proceedings, an inevitability with a jury, coupled
with the foreboding possibility of increasing the social stigma to the juve-
nile through the added publicity of a jury trial, weigh against extension
to juveniles of a right to trial by jury
7 Waiver of Privileges and Rights
The Supreme Court has not decided the circumstances under which
a juvenile can waive the privilege against self-incrimination or the right
to counsel. Lower courts have been divided on the question, some hold-
ing that the parents must join in the waiver for it to be valid, 6 others
holding that the minor himself can make a valid waiver.8 7 The Supreme
Court in Gault implied that the overriding consideration in determining
the validity of a waiver should be whether such waiver was voluntary
or was a result of fear, coercion, or fantasy, taking into consideration
the child's age, experience, and education.88
Following the Supreme Court's recent decisions regarding waiver of
due process in confessions of judgment by contract, it is arguable that a
child who, in law, can make only a voidable contract should be pre-
sumed incapable of making a knowing waiver of due process rights. In
Overmyer v. Frick, the Court ruled that confessions of judgment are
not unconstitutional per se for lack of due process; however, in Swarb
v. Lennox90 the Court did not disturb the holding of the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that consumers who earn less
than $10,000 per year are presumed incapable -of making a valid waiver
in certain transactions, unless it can be shown that prior to judgment
there was an absolutely knowing and voluntary waiver."'
In both Overmyer and Swarb, the Court was singularly concerned
with the individual's understanding of exactly what rights were being
waived and the consequences of waiving them. The difference in result
86. McClintock v. State, 253 Ind. 333, 253 N.E.2d 233 (1969); In re L, 29 App. Div. 2d
182, 287 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1968).
87. West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1102
(1969); People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967), cert.
dented, 392 US. 945 (1968).
88. 387 U.S. at 55.
89. 92 S.Ct. 775 (1972).
90. 92 S.Ct. 767 (1972).
91. Id. at 772. The lower court opinion is found at 314 F Supp. 1091 (ED. Pa. 1970).
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in both cases may lie in the identity of the party purportedly making the
waiver. In Overmyer, the waiving party was a corporation represented
'by counsel, which received consideration in return for its waiver. In
Swarb, the waiving parties were individuals without benefit of legal ad-
vice. If, then, the critical factor to the validity of a waiver is the identity
of the waiving party, a strong argument exists that a juvenile should be
presumed incapable of waiving his important due process rights, at least
in the absence of advice of counsel.
In Williams v. Huff,9 2 it was stated "as a matter of law that a boy of
17 cannot competently waive his right to counsel in a criminal case."
Moreover, in holding that a 15-year-old cannot give a valid consent to
surgery, the court in Bonner v. Moran9 3 stated: "In deference to common
experience, there is general recognition of the fact that many persons by
reason of their youth are incapable of intelligent decision, as the result
of which public policy demands legal protection of their personal as well
as their property rights." If the juvenile courts espouse a policy of pro-
tecting the youth from his own na'vet6, surely they cannot then exploit
the very weakness they have obligated themselves to protect. In this light,
the waiver by a youth of his constitutional rights should carry a strong
presumption of invalidity
S. Double Jeopardy
Before Gault, juvenile trials were regarded as wholly civil in nature,
and jeopardy never attached. 4 A minor adjudged delinquent could, at
the age of majority, face crminal charges based on the same misconduct,9
or, if he were not adjudged delinquent in the initial adjudication, his case
could be re-adjudicated. Language in Gault suggests that in delinquency
adjudications, jeopardy should attach if the conduct is criminal for an
adult: "A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found
'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is compara-
92. 142 F.2d 91, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (individual comment of the author of the majonty
opinion).
93. 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
94. See, e.g, Ex parte Martinez, 386 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Crim. 1964); People v. Silver-
stein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953); State v. Srmth, 75 N.D. 29, 25 N.W.2d
270 (1946); In re Santillanes 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); Moqum v. State, 216 Md.
524, 140 A2d 914 (1958). However, adjudication of delinquency and a subsequent trial
for the same act in criminal court was violative of due process rights guaranteed by the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.
95. This assumes that the applicable statute of limitations has not run.
1972]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ble in seriousness to a felony prosecution." 96 However, the question re-
mares unsettled.
The U J.C.A. appears to resolve the question in delinquency cases by
establishing a mutually exclusive system of jurisdiction between juvenile
and criminal courts, an adjudication or trial by either such court fore-
closing jurisdiction of the other.97 This was the result in Garzo v. State98
and Collins v. Texas,9 9 both holding the due process immunity from
double jeopardy applicable in juvenile delinquency adjudications. Such
holdings appear consonant with the spirit of Gault. Furthermore, to the
extent that the stigma and restraints on liberty resulting from a P.I.N.S.
adjudication are equivalent to those stemming from a delinquency ad-
judication, the same immunity from double jeopardy should be appli-
cable to P.I.N.S.
9 Appellate Review
The Supreme Court in 1894 concluded that a right to appellate review
is not within the parameters of due process.' 0 The right of a juvenile
to appeal a delinquency adjudication was raised but not decided in
Gault.'01 However, in In Re Brown,1 2 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit recently held that where a state statute grants an adult an
absolute right of appeal in a criminal case, the equal protection clause
requires that a juvenile have the right to appeal from any decision which
results in a restraint on his liberty 103 The court noted: "The informality
and flexibility of the juvenile adjudication and the subsequent treatment
96. 387 U.S. at 36. Although the court here was referring to the right to counsel, the
rationale is equally applicable to questions of double jeopardy Cf. 387 U.S. at 29.
97. A transfer to criminal court "terminates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over
the child with respect to the delinquent acts." UNn'olut JUVENILE CoURT Ac § 34(b)
"No child, either before or after reaching eighteen years of age shall be prosecuted
for an offense previously committed unless the case has been transferred as provided in
this section." Id. § 34(c).
98. 369 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Cnm. 1963).
99. 429 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
100. McKane v. Durston, 153 US. 684 (1894).
101. 387 US. at 58.
Several states have statutes granting the right of appeal to juveniles. See, e.g., N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-20-56 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr § 762 (McKinney's 1963).
102. 439 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1971).
103. The court relied on the reasoning of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), which
held that when a state has granted a right by statute, it cannot be limited arbitrarily
Thus, to the extent that a juvenile adjudication results in restraints on the liberty- of the
juvenile, a rational distinction between the juvenile proceeding and an adult crminal
proceeding is lacling. -
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make the right of appeal perhaps more, and certainly -not less, vital to
safeguard those subject to the juvenile process from the possible degen-
eration warned against in Gault." 1"
While the Brown decision concerned juvenile misconduct which
w.oild be ciminal in the case of an adult, the court's language can be ex-
tended to cover "uniquely juvenile" offenses. In the majority of states
with a-single class of juvenile misconduct, the restraints on liberty for
"'uniquely juvenile" misconduct are the same as those for juvenile crsma-
nal misconduct, and the right to appeal should be equally applicable. It
is submitted that the same result should obtain in the case of P.I.N.S. pro-
ceedings. Constitutional concepts of denial of liberty have not been
limited to physical incarceration, but include " the right of man to
be free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been en-
dowed by his Creator." -0 5 This language would appear to include such
',restraints on liberty" as restrictions on travel or association. Given the
possible consequences of a P.I.N.S. adjudication-strict formal probation,
removal from the natural home to a special school, and the possible com-
mitment to a state institution for misconduct while on probation-exten-
sion of Brown to P.I.N.S. should follow Thus, whenever a state provides
a right of appeal to adult criminal defendants, the same right should be
available to all juveniles.
10. Rigbt to a Transcript
Although a juvenile's right to a transcript of delinquency proceedings
also was raised and left unanswered in Gault,10 it is clear that a right to
appeal is hollow unless a transcript of the trial proceedings can be ob-
tained. Griffin v. Illinotsl 7 held that where a state has granted an abso-
lute right to appeal in criminal cases, a failure to provide transcripts to
indigent defendants was discriminatory and a denial of equal protection
of the laws. Combining Griffln with the argument of the preceding sec-
non, it would appear that if the right of appeal is applicable in juvenile
cases, the state must provide transcripts to juveniles who are unable to
bear the expense of their preparation.
CONCLUSION
Implicit in Gault is the Supreme Court's admonition that it will no
104. 439 F2d at 52.
105. MacMullen v. City of'Middletown, 112 App. Div. 81, 98 N.YS. 145, 150 (1906).
106. 387 U.S. at 58.
107. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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longer tolerate the denial of fundamental rights of juveniles m order that
juvenile courts may pursue an unobstructed parens patrwae course. While-
Gault extended several of the fundamental due process rights to delin-
quency adjudications, substantial questions remain as to whether other
rights also should be extended and whether these rights should attach to
other types of juvenile proceedings.
"Uniquely juvenile" misconduct poses a real dilemma for the juvenile
justice system. While it is widely agreed that the "uniquely juvenile"
offender must be handled through procedures which are designed almost
exclusively for rehabilitation, many such offenders presently are treatedt
no differently than juveniles who have committed criminal acts. The
most attractive solution to the dilemma of "uniquely juvenile" miscon-
duct would be the creation of non-judicial systems of rehabilitation. The
enactment by a minority of states of juvenile statutes differentiating
"umquely juvenile" misconduct from delinquent misconduct is certainly
a step in the right direction, and until non-judicial systems are created
bifurcated acts should be enacted in every state. In the meantime, an en-
largement of the due process rights of "uniquely juvenile" offenders,
especially in P.I.N.S. adjudications, is an essential temporary measure
until more effective means of rehabilitation can be established.
